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In a recent article, Mannion and Davies argue that there are a multitude of ways in which organizations (such 
as the National Health Service [NHS]) can deal with wrongdoing or ethical problems, including the formation 
of policies that encourage and protect would-be whistleblowers. However, it is important to distinguish 
internal reporting about wrongdoing from whistleblowing proper, because the two are morally quite different 
and should not be dealt with in the same way. This article argues that we should not understand the authors’ 
conclusions to apply to “whistleblowing” proper, because their recommended approach would be both 
unfeasible and undesirable for addressing whistleblowing defined in this way.
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In their recent article, Mannion and Davies1 argue that there are a multitude of ways in which organizations (such as the National Health Service [NHS]) can deal with 
wrongdoing or ethical problems, including the formation of 
policies that encourage and protect would-be whistleblowers. 
While such policies can be effective and helpful when utilized 
to encourage employees to report to managers internal to their 
organization, philosophers often distinguish this internal 
reporting from whistleblowing proper, which occurs when 
an employee reveals information externally (or publicly) 
about wrongdoing within the organization. It is important 
to distinguish internal reporting about wrongdoing from 
whistleblowing in this more restricted sense, because the 
two are morally quite different and should not be dealt with 
in the same way. I will argue that we should not understand 
the authors’ conclusions to apply to “whistleblowing” in 
the restrictive sense, because their recommended approach 
would be both unfeasible and undesirable for whistleblowing 
defined in this way.
Two Senses of the Term “Whistleblowing”
In the business ethics literature, where the topic has been 
most thoroughly treated, authors frequently distinguish 
whistleblowing from other kinds of reporting actions by 
defining whistleblowing as taking information about one’s 
organization public, or at least outside of normal channels.2-5 
While Mannion and Davies mention this definition at the 
beginning of their article, they later criticize those who think 
that whistleblowing is something “separate from normal 
organizational functioning.” Since the article focuses on 
ways in which healthcare organizations can improve their 
understanding and treatment of those who make these 
reports, it is clear that Mannion and Davies understand 
the term “whistleblowing” to encompass a wide variety of 
behaviors, including mere utilization of standard internal 
reporting procedures. 
Restricting the Term “Whistleblowing” Helps Preserve 
Important Moral Differences
However, reserving the term “whistleblowing” for those 
cases that involve going outside one’s organization is helpful 
because employees who consider performing this kind of 
whistleblowing are actually in a morally unique situation. 
These employees, unlike those who consider making an 
internal report, actually face a conflict of duties. Employees, 
upon entering employment by signing a contract, become 
involved with their employer in a morally special manner; 
each party has new obligations and rights as a result of the 
agreement. The obligations of employees are typically held 
to include a duty to avoid doing things that would harm the 
employer’s interests: for example by damaging the employer’s 
reputation, or by exposing proprietary information that 
might give an advantage to competitors. Employers are 
(understandably) only able to entrust sensitive information 
to employees on the condition that they will keep this 
information confidential. Sometimes this stipulation is spelled 
out in a contract and other times it is not, so these duties 
can be both explicit and implicit. In a case involving either 
serious wrongdoing or a serious risk of harm to a member of 
the public, then, the employee who knows about wrongdoing 
or risk faces a dilemma: she must either reveal sensitive 
information about her employer, in accordance with her 
general moral obligations; or she must keep the information 
confidential, in accordance with her special obligations to her 
employer.4,6 
One thing that this more restrictive definition makes clear 
   View Video Summary
MacDougall
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2016, 5(3), 189–191190
is why it is that whistleblowers often fare so poorly after 
whistleblowing. Whistleblowers fare poorly because the 
decision to whistleblow is by definition a tragic choice: a choice 
generally considered to always end in a failure to fulfill at least 
one obligation.7 Whistleblowers had to choose between failing 
in a duty to the public and failing in a duty to their employer, 
and they chose to fail in their duty to their employer. One 
might call into question whether moral tragedies are even 
theoretically possible (Kant did,8 and Mill probably would 
too). For example, at least one recent author has argued that 
the apparent conflict of duties is merely illusory, because in 
justified cases of whistleblowing the whistleblowing does not 
compete with any legitimate interest of the employer.9 There 
are theoretical considerations here that are beyond the scope 
of this essay. But in any case, whistleblowing always violates a 
pro tanto moral duty (ie, a duty we must keep under ordinary 
circumstances but which may be outweighed on occasion), 
and it is this fact that accounts for why whistleblowers often 
fare poorly: not only has the employee harmed the employer’s 
interest, but the employee has harmed that interest while 
breaking a pro tanto obligation to the employer, and so the 
employee’s actions seem morally tainted. 
Of course, internal reporters may fare poorly after their 
reports too. However, this retaliation is not always visited on 
the reporters by the organization itself — often, it is by those 
within the organization who were targeted by the report, 
either mid-level managers or other coworkers. In cases 
of whistleblowing proper, however, the corporation itself 
becomes the object of scrutiny, even if the whistleblower only 
mentions specific persons within the corporation. This is so 
because the mere fact of whistleblowing suggests that, not 
only is there corruption within the corporation, but further 
that the organization does not have the managerial integrity 
to satisfactorily resolve its own problems.5 So whistleblowing 
generally has worse consequences for employers than does 
mere internal reporting.
These considerations suggest that whistleblowers would 
be more likely to experience retaliation than those who 
merely give internal reports. Indeed, one meta-analysis 
found that employers are more likely to retaliate in cases of 
whistleblowing than in cases of mere internal reporting.10
However, in that meta-analysis Mesmer and Viswesvaran10 
also note that although retaliation is more likely in cases of 
external reporting, the correlation is not as strong as one 
might expect. They suggest that this is due to the fact that 
successful whistleblowers will generally place the target 
organization under increased scrutiny, and any attempt to 
retaliate against the whistleblower will likely be revealed again 
through the same channel (the whistleblower) and result in 
more public attention directed towards the organization’s 
internal operations. So even if an organization wishes to 
retaliate, it may face impediments to doing so. 
The best reason for thinking that employers face worse 
consequences from whistleblowing than they do from internal 
reporting, however, lies not in the prevalence of retaliation 
against whistleblowing employees, but rather in two widely 
known facts — first, that the vast majority of employers place 
a high value on a good public reputation, and second, that 
whistleblowing puts this reputation at risk in a way that 
internal reporting need not. While it is possible for companies 
to undertake internal investigations of wrongdoing without 
damaging their public reputation, it is usually not possible to 
avoid damaging a reputation when the accusations are public, 
as discussed above, even if the accusations later turn out to 
be untrue.
 
Should We Always Incentivize and Protect Whistleblowers?
From a societal perspective, internal reporting is highly 
desirable — especially in public institutions like the NHS. As 
Mannion and Davies observe, careful thought needs to be 
given to ways in which organizations can discover internal 
problems and solve them before they cause patients harm. 
Moreover, organizations themselves have a great interest 
in making sure such reporting occurs: they avoid hurting 
patients, of course, and they also avoid public relations 
problems, they keep employees happy, etc. In cases where 
an employee makes an internal report and it turns out that 
the employee misunderstood the supposed instance of 
wrongdoing, or where the employee’s alarm turns out to be 
a false alarm, managers can talk to employees and defuse the 
concerns without causing a public relations nightmare. Not 
only is this kind of reporting generally beneficial, but it is 
also possible for organizations to make this kind of reporting 
relatively accessible and safe. The highest authorities in the 
organization can protect those who report by keeping the 
source of the report anonymous, by moving employees to 
other areas of the organization, and perhaps by rewarding 
employees for looking out for the organization’s long-term 
interests.
In cases of whistleblowing in the restrictive sense, however, it 
is not clear that giving strong protection to whistleblowers is 
nearly as feasible. There has been a push for laws protecting 
the jobs of persons who whistleblow, for example. But even 
when a job is formally protected by legislation, employers 
have a multitude of methods for ending an employment 
relationship without actually firing the employee. By making 
the employee’s job more difficult, giving the employee the least 
desirable tasks or hours, refusing to promote an employee, or 
otherwise making the employee feel unwelcome, organizations 
can effectively end an employment relationship while still 
following the letter of the law. So, a committed organization 
can save an employee’s job, even if there is some resistance 
within the organization; but laws will not necessarily protect 
the whistleblower if an organization has decided to end the 
relationship with a whistleblower.
More importantly, however, even if it were possible to legislate 
complete protection for whistleblowers, such legislation would 
be undesirable. Policies that aim to encourage whistleblowing 
must try to hit something like a goldilocks standard — neither 
too hot nor too cold, but just right. If employees face few or 
no ramifications for whistleblowing actions, employees are 
more likely to make spurious information public — maybe 
because they misunderstand the actions they think they have 
observed, misinterpret what counts as unacceptable risk,11 
or perhaps even because they have malicious intent towards 
an employer. Whistleblowing can cause tremendous damage 
to organizations, even when the allegations turn out to be 
untrue. Although the damage that untrue revelations causes 
is not widely known, this does not mean it is uncommon— 
companies rarely have an interest in publicizing the amount of 
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damage that they have suffered as a result of false accusations.5 
Moreover, incentive programs that reward whistleblowers 
monetarily for their revelations — such as qui tam lawsuits that 
reward those who blow the whistle on companies defrauding 
the government — can have mixed results. In a 2001 case, 
whistleblower Douglas Durand received $77 million of an 
$885 million dollar settlement between his former employer 
(TAP Pharmaceutical Products) and the U.S. government. 
According to one report, the whistleblower himself had been 
in a position to prevent the actions that were the subject of the 
lawsuit; but instead of preventing them, he watched quietly 
and collected evidence to build his case.12 In a separate trial 
several years later a jury found the employees innocent of 
the charges that had been instrumental to the government’s 
victory in the earlier case against the corporation.13 Such a 
case suggests the possibility that incentives for whistleblowing 
can go too far.
On the other hand, if employees think there is no chance that 
their complaint will be heard, and that they will only suffer 
for their revelations, they may decide not to whistleblow 
even when whistleblowing could prevent great public 
harm. Designing public policy to protect or encourage 
whistleblowers must take this variety of possible outcomes 
into consideration, because the consequences of going too far 
either in incentivizing whistleblowing or in failing to protect 
whistleblowers can be severe.
It is crucial to remember that whistleblowing, in the sense 
of “going outside one’s organization,” raises numerous moral 
issues not associated with mere internal reporting about 
wrongdoing. While Mannion and Davies bring up a host of 
considerations that ought to be valuable to managers who are 
serious about improving their own organizations, there are 
good reasons to think that these considerations apply only 
to internal reporting and do not apply in the same way to 
“whistleblowing” in the more restrictive sense. It will always 
be preferable for organizations to deal internally with issues 
of wrongdoing than to drag the debate out into public — a 
process which often produces great harm to both the 
whistleblower and organization and may or may not benefit 
society at large. There is much to be gained by improving 
these internal reporting policies: most importantly, they can 
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